Annex I The Zone
Category A: Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and United Arab Emirates
Category B: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen.
Annex II Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency
1. All States Parties to this treaty will sign and ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as Non-nuclear-weapon States within five years of this treaty’s entry into force.
2. The safeguards referred to in article 1 paragraph 3 shall in respect of each State Party be applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency as set forth in an agreement negotiated and concluded with the Agency on all source or special fissionable material in all nuclear activities within the territory of the Party, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere.
3. The Agreement referred to in paragraph 2 above shall be equivalent, or equivalent in its scope and effect, to the agreement required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/153 corrected). A State Party that has already entered into a comprehensive safeguards agreement with an additional protocol (INFCIRC/540) with the IAEA is deemed to have already complied with the requirement. Each State Party shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that the Agreement referred to in paragraph 2 is in force for not later than eighteen months after the date of entry into force for that Party of this treaty.
3. Each Party shall include in its annual report to METO, in conformity with article 7 for its information and review, a copy of the overall conclusions of the most recent Safeguards Implementation Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency on its inspection activities in the territory of the Party concerned, and advise METO promptly of any change in those conclusions.
Annex III The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
1. All States Parties to this treaty will sign and ratify the Chemical Weapons convention (CWC).
2. The safeguards referred to in Article 1 paragraph 3 shall in respect of each Party be applied by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as set forth in an agreement negotiated and concluded with the OPCW on all dual uses material, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere.
3. METO will inform the States Parties to the treaty about any change in the list of materials.
4. For the purpose of this treaty, the safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 above shall have as their purpose the verification by the OPCW.
5. States Parties to this treaty will collaborate with the OPCW when it requests access to their facilities for a challenge inspection.
6. Each State Party shall include in its annual report to METO, in conformity with Article 7, a copy of the overall conclusions of the most recent report by the OPCW on its inspection activities in the territory of the Party concerned, and advise METO promptly of any change in those conclusions. The information furnished by a Party shall not be disclosed or transmitted to third parties, wholly or partially, except when that Party gives its express consent.
Annex IV The Biological Weapons Convention and the composite text
1. The safeguards referred to in Article 1 paragraph 3 shall in respect of each State Party be applied by METO in collaboration with the supporting unit of the BTWC as set forth in an agreement negotiated and concluded with METO on all source or special fissionable material in all related biological activities within the territory of the State Party, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere.
2. For the purpose of this treaty, and until the States Parties to the BTWC will agree on a verification protocol, the safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 above shall have as their purpose the verification set out by the Ad Hoc Group in 2001 (the composite text). As long as the composite text is not negotiated or agreed upon by the States Parties to the BTWC, updates to the composite states will be made by the METO General Assembly, and will take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the BTWC and this treaty.
3. States Parties to this treaty will collaborate with METO if it request access to open facilities for a challenge inspection.
4. Each State Party shall include in its annual report to METO, in conformity with Article 7, for its information and review, a copy of the overall conclusions of the most recent report by OPCW on its inspection activities in the territory of the Party concerned, and advise METO promptly of any change in those conclusions. The information furnished by a State Party shall not be disclosed or transmitted to third parties, wholly or partially, except when that Party gives its express consent.
Annex V METO
1. METO, established in Article 3 of this treaty, will function as the liaison between the States Parties to this treaty and the international WMD related organisations as well as the related UN functions.
2. METO will be located in a state within the Middle East/Mediterranean region, the host state will conclude a privileges and immunities agreement with METO and provide a cost free headquarters building; METO will conclude relationship agreements with the UN, IAEA, CTBTO and OPCW, as well as MOUs with OPANAL, AFCONE and other NWFZ institutions.
3. All WMDFZME parties will make financial contributions to METO in accordance with their UN scale of assessments to fund the activities of METO – the costs of METO will be kept to the minimum possible.
4. METO shall be the place where all States Parties or observers to this treaty will collaborate to execute the purposes of the treaty, in an open and safe environment, towards eliminating regional threats related to WMD and their means of delivery, and to cultivate a solid group of inspectors and scientists from the region.
5. The METO General Assembly will meet once a year for a two-week period to monitor the implementation of the treaty and any disputes that may have occurred throughout the preceding year.
6. The METO General Assembly will consist of representatives of all States Parties to this treaty, representatives of the IAEA, OPCW, BTWC Support Unit, CTBTO, UNSG, UNODA and the depository.
7. Civil society, academics, representatives of neighboring countries and in particular Pakistan and Turkey, and representatives of states possessing nuclear weapons will be invited to METO GA meetings as observers.
8. The METO GA will receive reports from the METO Council.
9. The METO Council will consist of specialists and diplomats from the zone, representing Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Syria and rotational states. The Council will consist of no more than 12 states at a time, including the above-mentioned states.
10. The METO Council will oversee the daily operations of METO and will deal with complaints and the settlement of disputes.
11. During the first ten years of METO, the Executive Director will be elected by a special committee consisting of the directors general of IAEA, OPCW, CTBTO and Under-Secretary General of UNODA, and this election will require ratification by the METO GA. During the first ten years, the Executive Director will not be a citizen of a state within the region, and METO itself will be hosted by an impartial state outside the region.
12. METO will consist of:
a) A department for capacity building, working with universities from the region and international organisations, to ensure strong and informed regional teams of inspectors and scientists, able to work together, update their knowledge and conduct research and inspections.
b) A nuclear department, working with the IAEA, CTBTO and UNODA on regional inspections, safety, security, safeguards and verification. a chemical department, working with the OPCW and UNODA, will operate oversight of commercial chemical use, updates regarding materials, as well as antidotes and resilience, and will develop robust capacities for emergency response and medical help within the region, for any chemical attack or accident. With the regional security department, the chemical department will monitor usage of CW by non-state actors.
c) A biological department working closely with the BTWC Implementation Support Unit, UNODA and international experts on a peer review program for the region, and will work on the updating of the composite text.
d) A regional security department, comprising diplomats and experts, focusing on means of delivery, mutual alarm systems, military collaboration, regional seminars, promoting of regional discourse, mapping regional threats and the guarding of the regional nuclear bank (RNB).
13. METO experts will advise states about safe disposal methods for hazardous materials.
14. METO will host a team of experts on renewable energy to promote regional cooperation on renewable energy facilities.
15. METO will actively promote signature and ratification of the CTBT, the CWC, BTWC, NPT and TPNW.
16. METO will collaborate with states and civil society organisations in the pursuit of the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD.
17. METO will offer guidance to states regarding their annual reports to the IAEA, OPCW and the BTWC and update them on any changes in policies or lists of approved or forbidden materials.
18. METO will inform and seek redress from the UN Security Council of any suspicion or an attempt by a state from outside the region to operate within the region in breach of the treaty.
19. METO will periodically host civil society working groups from within the region and outside it.
Annex VII Definition/Usage of terms
For the purpose of this treaty and its protocols:
1. “Middle East” means the territory of all the current States Parties to the League of Arab States, Iran and Israel, as illustrated in the map in Annex I.
2. “Weapons of mass destruction” (hereinafter referred to as WMD) are defined for the purposes of this treaty as nuclear explosive devices as defined in paragraph 7 of this article, chemical weapons as defined in paragraph 8 of this article, biological agents as defined in paragraph 10 of this article or toxins as defined in paragraph 9 of this article.
3. “Territory” means the land territory, internal waters, territorial seas and archipelagic waters and the airspace above them as well as the seabed and subsoil beneath.
4. “State Party” means a state that has ratified this treaty.
5. “Stationing” means implantation, emplacement, transport on land or inland waters, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment.
6. “Non-State Actors” means any individual or entity not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution.
7. “Nuclear explosive device” means any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device capable of rapidly releasing energy from a nuclear reaction with destructive effect, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used. The term includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms, but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it.
8. For the purpose of this treaty and its protocols, “chemical weapons” are defined as by the Chemical Weapons Convention in its Article II, and chemicals as defined in the Schedules of Chemicals in the CWC.
9. “Toxins” are poisonous products of organisms; unlike biological agents, they are inanimate and not capable of reproducing themselves.
10. “Biological agents” means any agent that depends for their effects on multiplication within the target organism and are intended for use in war to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants; they may be transmissible or non-transmissible. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.
11. “Nuclear material” means any source material or special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and as amended from time to time by the IAEA.