After the version 3 of the Draft Treaty was published, METO organized an extensive series of workshops and expert meetings in order to develop this version 4 which was prepared in readiness for the UN Conference to negotiate a WMD free zone in the Middle East which took place in November 2021. This iteration (DT4) is subject to change following further roundtable meetings with diplomats and stakeholders from the zone which will take place in 2022. A pdf version can be downloaded here.

If you would like to leave us a comment about any aspect of this text, please send an e-mail to info@wmd-free.me.

Preamble

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Determined to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the first resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, adopted on 24 January 1946, and subsequent resolutions which call for the elimination of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons,

Guided by various solemn declarations, resolutions and proposals on the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, including the declaration on a nuclear weapon-free zone adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 3263 of 09 December 1974 and, most recently, by Resolution A/RES/74/30 of 18 December 2019, and the resolution on achieving a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as part of its decision to extend the NPT indefinitely, which was reaffirmed by the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences,

Convinced of the need to take decisive steps towards the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, and that the creation of such a zone will be highly significant step towards the fulfilment of the related treaties and conventions, as well as promote international peace, stability, and security,

Deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental impacts, and the threats to the survival of peoples, cultures and states arising from the presence, use and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East,

Painfully aware of the suffering experienced by the victims that continues to this day of nuclear weapons, nuclear testing and chemical weapons use,

Mindful of the risks posed by the continued existence of weapons of mass destruction, including from any use by accident, miscalculation or design, and convinced that these risks concern the security of all humanity,

Conscious that the existence of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery incites arms races, violence and discord, endangering the security and well-being of peoples, the environment, socio-economic development, food security and the health of current and future generations, in the region and beyond and hindering cooperation and trust among governments,

Deeply concerned that the presence of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and associated capabilities may provide opportunity for non-state actors to commit acts leading to catastrophic destruction,

Convinced that the Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East will advance trade and development across the region, and render the Middle East free of environmental pollution, including radioactive and chemical wastes,

Affirming the need to work tirelessly towards the universalisation of all weapons-of-mass-destruction-related treaties, especially the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques,

Noting the success and importance of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones (henceforth NWFZ), and recognising that the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East would be a significant next step towards strengthening existing zones,

Considering in particular that establishment of the zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (henceforth WMDFZME) will enhance the adjoining NWFZs in Africa and Central Asia and strengthen the security of states and peoples in all other regions,

Recognising the importance of sustainable economic development throughout the Middle East and the important aspirations for technical cooperation across the region, including in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, chemistry, and biology,

Recognising also the rights and obligations of all States attached to the peaceful uses of relevant technologies: nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological,

Recognising also the importance of peace and disarmament education, the important role of civil society and welcoming the cooperation of all government, civil society and the participation of both women and men in the attainment of these objectives, as well as contributing to regional peace and security,

Have decided by this Treaty to establish a Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East,as follows:

Article 1 Scope of the treaty

Annex I (the Zone), and Annex II (definitions) to this treaty.
Except where otherwise specified, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are defined and updated in Annex II of this treaty (Definitions).

Article 2 Prohibitions

Each State Party (as defined in Annex II) to this treaty, undertakes never under any circumstances to:
1. Use, threaten to use, deploy or station (as defined in Annex II) WMD in the Zone;
2. Develop, manufacture, produce, test, stockpile or otherwise acquire, allow transit through its territory, including air space and territorial waters, possess or have control over any WMD;
3. Seek or receive any assistance in the development, financing, manufacture, testing, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any WMD;
4. To take any action to assist or encourage any State or other entity to carry out development, financing, manufacture, stockpiling, testing or acquisition, or possession of any WMD;
5. Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, any State or other entity to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this treaty.
Each State Party undertakes:
1. To prohibit the stationing, installation, deployment, or testing of any WMD in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control;
2. To prohibit visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic waters if they are known to carry WMD or suspected of doing so, unless they are participating in UN-sanctioned operations or are covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lane passage or transit passage of straits and airspace.
3. Not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to any State unless subjected to a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
Each State Party to this treaty undertakes not to receive or transfer to any recipient or receive from any supplier whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of states, non-state actors or international organisations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any materials or equipment for WMD prohibited under this treaty.
Each State Party undertakes not to take, or assist, or encourage state or non-state actors (as defined in Annex II) in any action aimed at an attack by conventional, cyber or any other means against any peaceful nuclear, chemical and biological installations in the Zone.

Article 3 Obligations

Each State Party to this treaty undertakes:
1. To handle all radioactive, nuclear, chemical and biological wastes in accordance with the Middle East Treaty Organisation (METO) waste handling and disposal regulations, in accordance with Article 5, Paragraph 9 (5) of this Treaty;
2. Not to take any action to assist or encourage the dumping of radioactive wastes and other chemical, biological and radioactive matter, anywhere within the Zone;
3. To provide the Assembly, as described in Article 5, Paragraph 7 of this Treaty, with data relating to any plan for the disposal of radioactive, chemical or biological waste in any form to determine that it conforms to METO regulations and to determine whether the disposition is liable to result in the contamination of the waters, soil, sub-soil or airspace of any member state.
4. To ensure all radioactive waste and other radioactive materials will be handled in accordance with the safety and security standards established by METO, and in accordance with IAEA and United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) standards;
5. To work closely with METO in verification procedures for nuclear, biological and chemical materials, to ensure the safety of the environment and the people of the Zone in relation to WMD-related materials.
Each State Party to this Treaty that is not already party to the following treaties shall become a State Party to each of them: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC); the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), not later than eighteen months after the date of entry into force for that Party of this Treaty.
Each State party to this Treaty undertakes to destroy any chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon in its possession in accordance respectively with the procedures of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW); [the Implementation Support Unit of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (ISU)]; and the procedures laid out by the competent international authority designated by the TPNW.
As part of their efforts to strengthen their security and stability, States Parties undertake to fully cooperate with official regional and international bodies relevant to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear science, in accordance with regulations established by the IAEA and by METO, and in accordance with Article 5 of this Treaty.
The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing international agreements, to which they are party, where those obligations are consistent with the Treaty.

Article 4 Permitted Activities

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as preventing the use of nuclear sciences and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article IV of the NPT and relevant IAEA guidance for safeguards, safety and security.
Each State Party has the right to peaceful uses of chemical technology: to develop, produce or otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use chemicals and their precursors (as defined in Annex II) for purposes not prohibited under the CWC and the OPCW, including periodic updates by the OPCW.
Each State Party to this treaty shall notify METO on related collaboration with other states, within or outside the region, as long as chemical materials specified in the CWC Schedules of Chemicals are involved.
Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice the right of each State Party, individually or in cooperation with others, to conduct research, development, production or other acquisition, storage, transfer and use of microbial and other biological agents (as defined in Annex II) and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with Articles I and X of the BTWC.
Each State Party undertakes:
1. To conduct all activities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy under strict nuclear non-proliferation, safety and security measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful, safe and secure use of nuclear energy,
2. to implement all relevant provisions concerning the safety and protection of nuclear materials following the provisions of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005), and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM),
3. The BTWC composite text shall be used by the States Parties to this treaty, as long as there is no other BTWC compliance document agreed by all States Parties to this treaty.

Article 5 The Middle East Treaty Organisation [METO]

States Parties shall establish the Middle East Treaty Organisation (METO).
METO will serve as the implementing organisation for this Treaty.
METO shall be hosted in a state agreed upon by all States Parties to this Treaty. The host state will conclude a privileges and immunities agreement with METO and provide a headquarters building.
METO shall function as the liaison between the States Parties to this Treaty and the multilateral organisations dealing with WMD non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as the related UN functions.
METO shall be the place where all States Parties to this Treaty shall collaborate to execute the purposes of this Treaty, in an open and safe environment, towards eliminating regional threats related to WMD and their means of delivery, and to cultivate a solid group of inspectors and scientists from the region.
METO shall be responsible, in collaboration with the relevant organisations, for:
1. Reviewing reports and exchanges of information as provided for in Article 7 (report and exchange of information);
2. Arranging consultations as well as convening conferences of States Parties on the concurrence of a simple majority on any matter arising from the implementation of the Treaty;
3. Supporting States Parties in reporting peaceful activities to the IAEA and OPCW, as elaborated in Annex III of this Treaty;
4. Supporting the IAEA and OPCW on safeguard and verification activities, as described in Annex III of this Treaty, if requested by those organisations;
5. Implementing the Common System for Verification and Monitoring of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Materials, as outlined in an Annex III of this treaty, in collaboration and cooperation with national regulators or designated authorities in States Parties and with relevant international organisations;
6. Encouraging and assisting regional and sub-regional programmes for cooperation in capacity building for future regional inspection teams;
7. Providing an open and safe environment for meetings and discussion for experts from the Zone;
8. Providing capacity building programmes for students and experts from the Zone alongside other relevant organisations on effective implementation of this Treaty;
9. Encouraging regional, international and sub-regional cooperation on the promotion of sustainable energy;
Shall consist of two main structures:
1. The Assembly of States Parties (hereinafter referred to as “The Assembly”)
2. The Secretariat
The Assembly:
1. Shall consist of representatives of all States Parties to this treaty, as defined in Annex I to this Treaty, with full voting rights,
2. May include representatives of the IAEA, the OPCW, the ISU, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG), the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), as well as invited observer states, relevant organisations, civil society, academics, and representatives of States Parties to Protocol I, II, and III to this Treaty, who may participate in the Assembly as observers, with no voting rights,
3. Shall elect a Secretary-General for a mandate of four years, with the possibility of one renewal;
4. Shall approve Deputy Secretary-Generals through a majority vote, who will assist the Secretary-General in conducting the activities defined in Paragraph 9 of this Article;
5. Shall inform and request information from the United Nations Security Council of any suspicion or attempt by a state from outside the region to operate within the region in breach of this Treaty;
6. Shall meet in regular session at least once every year;
7. May meet in extraordinary session following a written request by States Parties to this Treaty or by the Secretary-General.
The Secretariat:
1. Shall support the Secretary-General in conducting the organisation’s daily activities and provide technical expertise for such activities;
2. Shall ensure the application of The Common System for Confidence-Building and Verification of Nuclear, Fissile, Chemical, and Biological Technology, as defined in Annex III to this Treaty;
3. Shall foster capacity building activities within States Parties, working with universities from the region and international organisations, to ensure strong and informed regional teams of inspectors and scientists, able to work together, update their knowledge and conduct research and inspections;
4. Shall advise States Parties about safe disposal methods for hazardous materials;
5. Develop periodic waste handling and disposal regulations to handle radioactive, nuclear, chemical and biological wastes and disposal regulations;
6. Shall collaborate with States Parties and civil society organisations in the pursuit of the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD;
7. Shall offer guidance to States Parties regarding their annual reports to the IAEA, the OPCW and the BTWC and update them on any changes in policies, schedules or lists of approved or forbidden materials.
Pending entry into force of this Treaty, States Parties agree to establish a METO Preparatory Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”) for the purpose of carrying out the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of this Treaty and the establishment of METO.
States Parties to this Treaty shall provide the Commission with the resources and a mandate to implement this Treaty and the activities defined in Paragraph 9 of this Article.

Article 6 Declarations, Dismantlement, Destruction or Conversion

Each State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General, no later than three months after entry into force of this Treaty, or the depositing of instruments of accession to this Treaty, the following declarations, in which it shall:
1. Declare any capability for the manufacture and possession of any WMD (as described in Annex II to this Treaty) or whether there are any weapons of mass destruction located in any place under its jurisdiction of control;
2. Declare whether it is a State Party to the NPT and the TPNW, and which safeguards agreements it has concluded with the IAEA;
3. Declare whether it is a State Party to the CWC and whether it has destroyed, or is in the process of destroying, chemical weapons under the supervision of the OPCW;
4. Declare whether it is a State Party to the BTWC, and if so, whether it has destroyed or is in the process of destroying, biological weapons pursuant to Article 2 of that treaty.
The Secretary-General shall present a report on such declarations to States Parties.
Each State Party that has not done so shall, pursuant to Article 3, Paragraph 2 of this Treaty, accede to the CWC and the BTWC, and, pursuant to Article 3, Paragraph 3 of this Treaty, destroy or convert into peaceful purposes any chemical or biological weapons and manufacturing facilities it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of those treaties. This includes destruction or conversion into peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment specified in Article I, II and III of the CWC.
Each State Party that has declared that it does not own or possess any nuclear weapons and that there are no nuclear weapons located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, pursuant to Article 3, Paragraph 3 of this Treaty, shall conclude a Safeguards Agreement with an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
Each State Party that is not a State Party to the NPT and the TPNW and that has declared that it owns or possesses nuclear weapons shall, as soon as possible and following the guidelines and a destruction schedule determined by the TPNW, deactivate, disable, dismantle, separate from means of delivery, or otherwise remove from operational status all nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices it owns, possesses, or hosts.

Article 7 Report and exchange of information

Each State Party shall submit annual reports to METO on its nuclear, chemical and biological activities as well as other matters relating to this Treaty, in accordance with the format for reporting to be developed by the Secretariat and agreed by the Assembly.
Each State Party shall promptly report to the Secretariat any event affecting the implementation of this Treaty.

Article 8 Safety Measures of nuclear, biological and chemical materials and facilities

Each State Party undertakes to maintain and update the highest standards of safety and security and effective protection of nuclear materials (as defined in Annex II) chemical materials and biological materials, their facilities and equipment to prevent theft or unauthorised use and handling.
Each State Party, in addition to its own national regulations, undertakes to apply safety measures equivalent to or higher than those provided for in the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material/Amended and in standards, and the safety recommendations and guidelines developed by the IAEA.
Each State Party, in addition to its own national regulations, undertakes to apply safety measures equivalent to or higher than those provided by the OPCW on chemical materials and facilities, and any other measures developed by METO for that purpose.
Each State Party, in addition to its own national regulations, undertakes to apply safety measures equivalent to or higher than those provided and by the BTWC on biological materials and facilities, as well as additional guidelines on biosafety and biosecurity define by the World Health Organisation.
In addition to safety standards and regulations mentioned on Paragraphs 1 to 4 of this Article, States Parties undertake to follow any other additional safety regulations for nuclear, chemical, and biological materials developed by METO.

Article 9 Sustainable Energy

Each State Party to this Treaty shall collaborate with METO, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), and other relevant organisations to promote safe, sustainable and diverse energy sources, including renewable energy, in recognition of its significant contribution to human security and development in the region.

Article 10 Protection of populations and the environment

In the implementation of this Treaty, each State Party shall take all necessary safety precautions to protect populations and the environment.
Each State Party to this Treaty shall inform the OPCW, the UN Security Council and METO on any suspicion or any evidence of chemical weapon use in their territory, and shall allow humanitarian organisations to offer medical assistance.
Each State Party to this Treaty shall inform the UN Security Council, the ISU and METO of any evidence of biological weapon use in their territory, and will allow humanitarian organisations to offer medical assistance.
Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to provide or support assistance in accordance with METO requirements, to any State Party to the treaty which so requests, following approval of the request by the Assembly.
Each state party to this treaty shall implement, in regards to individuals under its jurisdiction who are affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, appropriate measures to provide assistance and remediation under humanitarian and human rights law, pursuant to Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the TPNW.
Each state Party, in regards to areas under its jurisdiction or control which are contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, shall take necessary and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation of areas so contaminated, pursuant to Article 6, Paragraph 2 of the TPNW.
Each state party to this treaty shall implement, in regards to individuals under its jurisdiction who are affected by the use or testing of chemical and biological weapons, appropriate measures to provide assistance and remediation under humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, without discrimination, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion.
Each State Party, in regards to areas under its jurisdiction or control which are contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of chemical and biological weapons, shall take necessary and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation of areas so contaminated.

Article 11 Settlement of Disputes

Any dispute arising out of the interpretation of the treaty shall be settled by negotiation.
Decisions of States Parties shall be made by consensus or, if previously agreed by consensus, by qualified majority of States Parties.
If consensus cannot be achieved within a period of 12 calendar months, the dispute shall be resolved through arbitration or through referral to the International Court of Justice, unless the Parties agree on another dispute settlement system established by international law.

Article 12 Reservations

Once this Treaty is adopted by the States that negotiated it, the articles of this Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 13 Signature, ratification and entry into force

This Treaty shall be open for signature by all States in the Middle East zone, as described in Annex I.
The Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the legislative requirements of each State Party.
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States will be invited to sign a Protocol to this Treaty respecting its terms.
For each State Party, this Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the agreed upon instruments of ratifications.
This Treaty shall enter into force only after ratification by 13 of the states defined in Annex I of this Treaty.
For a State that accedes to this Treaty after it has entered into force, this Treaty shall be binding for that State on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification.

Article 14 Amendments

Any State Party to this Treaty, as well as the Secretary-General, can propose Amendments to this Treaty. Amendment proposals shall be submitted to the Assembly.
If agreed by at least five States Parties to this Treaty, the amendment proposals shall be discussed in the subsequent session of the Assembly.
The decision on the adoption of such an amendment shall be taken by a qualified majority of States Parties in the Assembly.
An amendment so adopted shall enter into force after receipt by the Depositary.
Any amendment shall only be applicable to the states that have adopted it.

Article 15 Duration and Withdrawal

The duration of the Treaty is unlimited.
Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country.
Withdrawing States Parties shall give notice of such withdrawal in writing to the Assembly and the Depositary. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events that it regards as having jeopardised its supreme interests.
Within twelve months, the Secretary-General shall work to resolve the extraordinary security concerns of the State Party in consultation with the other States Parties.
Such withdrawal shall take effect twelve months after the date of the receipt of the notification of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that twelve-month period, the withdrawing State Party is a party to an armed conflict, the State Party shall continue to be bound by the obligations of this Treaty and of any additional protocols until it is no longer party to an armed conflict.
The Secretary-General shall communicate the withdrawal to the remaining States Parties, to the Assembly, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the United Nations Security Council.
The Assembly shall, by consensus, implement further measures and procedures to the withdrawal process.

Article 16 Depositary functions

[The Secretary-General of the United Nations] shall be the depositary of this treaty. The Depositary shall:

Receive instruments of ratification or accession by States Parties.
Register this Treaty and its protocols pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Transmit certified copies of the Treaty and its protocols to all States Parties of the Treaty and to all States to which the protocols to the Treaty shall be open, and shall notify them of any signature, ratification of, or accession to the Treaty and its protocols.

Article 17 Authentic text

The Arabic, Persian, Hebrew, French, English, Chinese, Spanish, and Russian text of this treaty, shall be equally authentic.

Article 18 Status of the annexes

The annexes form an integral part of the Treaty. Any reference to this Treaty includes the annexes.

Annexes

Annex I The Zone

This Treaty shall be open to all current members of the League of Arab States (Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen), the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Israel.

Annex II Definition/Usage of terms

For the purpose of this treaty and its protocols:

“Middle East” means the territory of all the current States Parties to the League of Arab States, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel, as defined in Annex I to this Treaty.
“Weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) are defined for the purposes of this treaty as any nuclear explosive devices, as defined in Article 7 of this Annex; chemical weapons, as defined in Article II of the CWC, and chemicals as defined in the Schedules of Chemicals in the CWC; and biological agents and Toxins, as referred to in the BTWC and defined in Articles 9 and 10 of this Annex.
“Territory” means the land territory, internal waters, territorial seas and archipelagic waters and the airspace above them as well as the sea bed and subsoil beneath.
“State Party” means a state that has ratified or acceded to this Treaty.
“Stationing” means implantation, emplacement, transport on land or inland waters, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment.
“Non-State Actor” means any individual or entity not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this Treaty.
“Nuclear explosive device” means any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device capable of rapidly releasing energy from a nuclear reaction with destructive effect, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used. The term includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms, but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it.
“Nuclear material” means any source material or special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute of the IAEA and as amended from time to time by the IAEA.
“Toxins” are poisonous products of organisms; unlike biological agents, they are inanimate and not capable of reproducing themselves.
“Biological agents” means any agent that depends for their effects on multiplication within the target organism and are intended for use in warfare to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants; they may be transmissible or non-transmissible. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.
11. “Means of delivery” and “delivery systems” mean missiles, rockets, submarines, aircraft carriers, drones, and other systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical or biological weapons that are specially designed and have been tested for such use.

Annex III The Common System

[The Common System for Confidence-Building and Verification of Nuclear, Fissile, Chemical, and Biological Materials]

Article 1 Guiding Principles

States Parties shall establish a Common System for Monitoring, Accounting, Safeguarding, Verifying and Controlling Nuclear, Fissile, Chemical, and Biological Materials (hereinafter referred to as “the Common System”), with the objective of ensuring that such materials are diverted to the purposes prohibited by this Treaty.
The Common System shall complement and reinforce existing international obligations undertaken by States Parties under previous safeguards and verification treaties with relevant international organisations, particularly the IAEA and the OPCW, avoiding duplication of activities.
The Common System shall foster transparency and confidence between States Parties.
The Common System shall be administered and implemented by the Secretariat, following the principles and practices specified in this Annex.
The Secretariat shall request cooperation with the IAEA and the OPCW in the implementation of the Common System and in capacity-building, pursuant to Article 5 Paragraph 9 (b) and (c) of this Treaty.
The Assembly shall oversee the due implementation of the Common System in regular and [timely] manner.
Nothing in this Annex shall undermine States Parties right to peacefully conduct any activity permitted under Article 4 of this Treaty.

Article 2 Monitoring and Verification

Monitoring activities include procedures and activities aimed at ensuring that materials are not diverted to activities prohibited by Article 2 of this Treaty. The Secretariat shall conduct those procedures in a transparent and continuous manner, being accountable to the Assembly.
Each State Party shall allow METO to monitor the implementation of the voluntary measures for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency measures, pursuant to Article 1, Paragraph 4 to this Annex.
METO will implement, if appropriate, containment and surveillance activities in cooperation with associated international organisations to ensure effective monitoring of activities involving nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the region.
Verification Procedures within The Common System are complementary to Monitoring activities and intend to detect, with a reasonable degree of certainty, whether States Parties are in compliance with obligations undertaken under Article 3 to this Treaty.
Verification procedures within The Common System consist of general and specific procedural guidelines, manuals, technical briefings, and periodical reports by States Parties, pursuant to Article 8 of this Treaty, or of any other procedure or activity deemed necessary by the Secretariat and approved by the Assembly to ensure the peaceful uses of nuclear, chemical, and bio technology.

Article 3 Implementation

METO shall implement the Common System in cooperation with all the States Parties of this Treaty in a regular and timely manner.
The Secretariat shall propose technical, technological, and procedural amendments to this Annex, pursuant to Article 14, Paragraph 1 of this Treaty, as well as implement any changes deemed necessary by the Assembly.
When appropriate, implementation measures may include mutual and cross-country inspections, verifications and safeguards fact-checking missions, joint-inspections with relevant international organisations, or referral to other organisations to conduct own inspections and verification missions.
METO may establish ad hoc advisory groups to improve the Common System and to ensure the efficient use of budgetary and human resources.
Each State Party shall submit yearly reports on all activities under the scope of this Treaty, pursuant to Articles 3 and 4 of this Treaty, and, whenever necessary, allow METO inspectors to access to relevant nuclear, fissile, chemical, and biological materials and associated facilities.
States Parties shall cooperate with METO, the IAEA, and the OPCW to provide relevant information associated to the possession, misuse, and deviation of nuclear, fissile, chemical, and biological technology.
Until the entry into force of this Treaty the Commission, pursuant to Article 5, Paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Treaty, shall carry out the activities determined by this Annex aiming at the effective implementation of this Treaty.

Article 4 Monitoring and Verification Missions

The Secretariat shall coordinate with National Authorities and Governments of States Parties to develop a Roster of independent pre-approved stand-by inspectors and associated inspectors with appropriate and relevant technical expertise to implement monitoring and verification activities defined in Article 2 of this Annex.
Each State Party shall suggest names to be included on the Roster. Those names will be approved by the Assembly in regular meetings at least once every year and the Roster will be made available to the Secretariat.
Inspectors in METO ad hoc inspection missions and in METO monitoring and verification missions shall be selected from the Roster according to their expertise and hired on an ad hoc basis, unless determined otherwise by the Secretary-General.
The Secretariat, should aim at ensuring gender parity in the Roster.
Each State Party will be offered the opportunity to provide names to be incorporated into the pre-approved Inspectors Roster.
Inspectors shall to be selected to participate in METO ad hoc inspection missions and METO monitoring and verification missions randomly, but still in accordance with their expertise.
States Parties shall have the right to request that specific names from the pre-approved Roster be hired as inspectors on specific missions. Such requests should be informed to the Secretary-General and submitted in a written communication to the Assembly. The Assembly should convene an extraordinary meeting to discuss and approve such requests in no less than 48 hours.
Each State Party shall have the right to object to specific names from the pre-approved roster being hired as inspectors on specific missions. Such objections should be informed to the Secretary-General and submitted in a written communication to the Assembly, which should convene an extraordinary meeting to discuss and approve such objections in no less than 48 hours.
Each State Party that hosts METO ad hoc inspection missions, and METO monitoring and verification missions shall have the right to request the participation of a National Observer on specific missions. A request for a National Observer should be informed to the Secretary-General and submitted in a written communication to the Assembly, which should convene an extraordinary meeting to discuss and approve such requests in no less than 48 hours.
Each State Party shall provide METO ad hoc inspection missions, and METO monitoring and verification missions with necessary diplomatic immunities to conduct tasks determined by the Secretariat and given full access to their nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities, in accordance with the objectives of this Treaty.
As approved by the Assembly, monitoring and verification missions may also access Research & Development activities that are suspected to be in violation of Articles 2, 3 and 4 of this Treaty.
METO ad hoc inspection missions, challenge inspections, and METO monitoring and verification missions shall be implemented in a timely manner. Ad hoc Fact-Checking Missions should be established within no less than 48 hours, except when otherwise determined by the Assembly.

Article 5 Status of Inspectors

Inspectors hired to participate in METO ad hoc inspection missions and METO monitoring and verification missions shall be accountable to the Secretariat and follow the Ethics and Good Practices Guidelines determined by it.
During their missions, inspectors will hold the necessary diplomatic immunities granted to international organisation employees by International Law, as well as multiple-entry visas limited to the mandate of the mission.

Article 6 Safeguards of Nuclear and Fissile Materials

Each State Party to this treaty that has not yet done so shall accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon State and to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), pursuant to Article 3, Paragraph 2 and Article 6, Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Treaty.
Each State Party that has not yet done so shall conclude with the IAEA and bring into force, an agreement for the application of safeguards in accordance with the NPT (INFCIRC/153 (Corr.)), and an Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)) no later than eighteen months after the entry into force of this Treaty.
The Secretariat, pursuant to the principles determined in Article 1 of this Annex, shall support and assist States Parties in fulfilling their international obligations regarding safeguards of nuclear and fissile materials, as determined in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.
Each State Party shall include in its annual report to METO, pursuant to Article 6 of this Treaty, a notification of the safeguards conclusions for the State party as noted in the most recent Safeguards Implementation Report of the IAEA.
Pursuant to Article 3, Paragraph 3 of this Annex, METO may implement its own fact-checking verification missions on nuclear facilities of States Parties, as well as joint-missions with the IAEA.

Article 7 Verification of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities or Suspected Chemical Weapons Production Facilities

Each State Party to this treaty shall accede to the CWC, pursuant to Article 3, Paragraph 2 of this Treaty.
States Parties shall conclude with the OPCW the necessary agreements and protocols for the appropriate and timely application of verification procedures underlined in the CWC, pursuant to Article 3, Paragraph 3 of this Treaty.
Each State Party to this treaty shall collaborate with the OPCW whenever that organisation requests access to their facilities for a challenge inspection.
METO shall support States Parties in fulfilling their international obligations under Article 7 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Annex.
The Secretariat shall prepare supplementary list of materials and activities associated with the non-proliferation and disarmament of chemical materials, to be approved by the Assembly and, when appropriate, monitored and verified by METO ad hoc verification and monitoring missions, as described in Article 3 and 4 of this Annex.
Each State Party shall include in its annual report to METO, in conformity with this Article, a copy of the overall conclusions of the most recent report by the OPCW on its inspection activities in the territory of the State Party concerned, and advise METO promptly of any change in those conclusions. The Secretariat shall not disclose nor transmit any information furnished by a State Party, wholly or partially, to third parties, except when the concerned State Party gives its express consent in a written form.

Article 8 Verification of Biological Weapons Production Facilities or Suspected Biological Weapons Production Facilities

Each State Party to this treaty shall accede the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), following Article 3, Paragraph 2 of this Treaty.
States Parties shall coordinate with the Secretariat and with relevant international institutions to develop appropriate monitoring measures on safety and control of biotechnology-related activities within their territories or carried out under their jurisdiction elsewhere.
For the purposes of this Treaty, and until the States Parties to the BTWC agree on a verification protocol, verification and monitoring of biological dual-use technology, as referred to in the BTCW, shall be that set out by the Ad Hoc Group in 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the “Composite Text”).
Until the Composite Text is agreed upon by all the States Parties to the BTWC, States Parties to this Treaty shall follow updates to the Composite Text determined by the Assembly under the guidance and technical support of the Secretariat.
The Secretariat shall follow any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the BTWC and this Treaty, and assist States Parties in ensuring that biotechnology and agents are managed and processes carried out peacefully.
States Parties to this Treaty will collaborate with METO if it requests access to open facilities for challenge inspections, as set forth in Article 4 of this Annex.
The Secretariat shall facilitate measures and activities aimed at fostering capacity-building, awareness-raising among scientists within States Parties, pursuant to Article 5, Paragraph 9 (c) of this Treaty, education programmes and safety protocols for research activities, up-to-date codes of ethics and conduct, and other activities requested by the Assembly or by States Parties aimed at preventing the proliferation of biological weapons.
The Secretariat may assist States Parties in developing effective early warning systems to avoid the outbreak of infectious diseases.

Article 9 Further Confidence-Building Measures

States Parties to this Treaty shall establish an ad hoc group under the framework of METO to discuss further Confidence-Building Measures.
States Parties shall establish in the first meeting of the Commission an ad hoc group to discuss a protocol on the verification, monitoring, control, and limitation of means of delivery of WMD, as defined in Annex II, Paragraph 11 of this Treaty.

Draft Treaty V4 #2

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